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SUPERNATURALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
CHARACTER OF THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN THINKER
H.M. Majeed1 
Abstract
Owing to the prevalence of belief in spiritual beings and in the reality 
of some non-physical events in traditional cultures like those of Africa, 
the orientation of the people is typically regarded as supernaturalistic. 
But while some anthropologists and philosophers see belief in the 
supernatural as irrational, others argue in ways that seem to suggest 
that supernaturalism limits the rational capacity of the African thinker. 
This paper rejects the positions held by these scholars and, using Akan 
traditional wisdom, argues for the possibility of extricating rationality 
from the domain of cultures – making rationality a matter of conceptual, 
noncultural objectivity.
Introduction
A traditional culture is typically perceived as a non-Western one (such 
as the African Azande). It is portrayed as non-scientific or as approving 
or disapproving of things not on scientific grounds, but for supernatural-
related reasons. Conversely, a Western culture is, seen as scientific and 
rational. Although the propriety of these characterizations is not the 
focus of this paper, it is right to caution that the characterizations could 
be misleading. For instance, I do not think that referring to a Western 
culture as “scientific,” suggests that there cannot be any persons from 
that culture who engage in rituals. Hence, the description of a culture as 
rational or irrational needs to be understood in a special sense. It only 
indicates that in social or intercultural philosophy where predominant 
views are sometimes used to characterize cultures in traditional-scientific 
or supernatural-antisupernatural terms, it is also possible to apply or 
at least learn to apply the concept of rationality in this general context. 
When E. R. Dodds (1951: 1) classified the supernatural as “irrational” and 
praised the West for its rational credentials, he was applying the concept 
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in this sense. This is because there has never actually been a time when 
all Westerners were antisupernaturalistic, neither have the Greeks (whose 
philosophy arguably underpins Western civilization) ever had this kind of 
situation. Thus, the paper explores the general concept of supernaturalism 
(as done by its critics), but does not focus on specific instances of the 
supernatural.
Supernaturalism  is sometimes used, as in the case of MacIntyre and others 
like him, in specific reference to belief in such notions as witchcraft and 
magic, which are regarded as irrational (although belief in God – Christian, 
Jewish, or Muslim, also counts as supernatural,, the view of such scholars 
is that a belief in these religions is not irrational, though this view always 
remains curiously unstated). In this paper, the belief in witchcraft or 
magic will be regarded as supernaturalism. In its primal sense therefore, 
supernaturalism is an orientation or a disposition and, in some sense, a 
world-view. This paper first identifies the flaws in the arguments advanced 
for the exclusion of supernaturalistic African thinkers from rationality. 
While the paper rejects any claim of contradiction between rationality 
and supernaturalism, it does not argue that anything supernatural should 
be rational. It contends that having a supernaturalistic orientation does 
not preclude determining the rationality of issues, and that it is possible 
to understand rationality as a human attribute but not necessarily as a 
product of any specific culture. 
An action or belief which is rational is one that conforms to logical 
procedure and is intelligible. For the order that it will bring to the 
discussion, it is important to be guided also by some distinctions made 
by Anthony Flew with regard to rationality. He maintains that if a person 
is said to be rational, the term ‘rational’ could be understood in two 
senses: as (i) “[o]pposed to irrational,” and (ii) “[o]pposed to non-rational 
or arational” (1979: 298). Although Flew does not explain at all what he 
means by the former sense (i), it is most likely applicable to actions or 
thoughts or beliefs, while the latter is meant to explain rationality as a 
distinctive feature of a person (i.e., a person “as the rational animal”, as he 
indicates). The limitation of Flew’s definitions is that they do not indicate 
that arationality could refer to thoughts and actions as well. For instance, 
if I need to get to a store that closes in five minutes, it is irrational to take 
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a long meandering walk and chat with people along the way. If, on the 
other hand, I just want to go for a walk, meandering and chatting are non-
rational behaviours. 
To say then that a person (in sense (ii)) is the only creature that is rational is 
to suggest that he alone has a thinking ability, and a capacity for intelligent 
behaviour or action. In the former sense, a person is normally said to 
have behaved or acted rationally when his action or behaviour is seen to 
have been in line with rational procedure. However, based on the beliefs 
common in a culture, and on the way the people of that culture go about 
their activities, a culture – although in actuality we mean its people – is 
sometimes described as rational, scientific, traditional or primitive. Since, 
in this paper, (i) the concept of rationality will be discussed in connection 
with cultures [i.e. whether or not rationality is a cultural construct], and 
(ii) arationality is not discussed, the former sense of rationality is the main 
concern of this essay. Rationality is thus explored in a context where an 
entire culture is the object of enquiry.
In an attempt to understand alien cultures, philosophers and 
anthropologists often try as much as possible to spell out both how such 
cultures’ beliefs, practices, and values could be considered to be rational 
(that is, “intelligible”), and how the cultures can be seen to be using some 
standards to determine the rationality of beliefs and actions. This paper 
concerns itself mainly with the issue of standards. Although on a number 
of occasions it is claimed by some scholars1 that traditional cultures 
(such as those of Africa) can determine the “rationality” of actions and 
beliefs, others disagree. Some, first, have questioned the capacity of 
such traditional cultures to make judgments of rationality that extend to 
issues pertaining to a paradigm which is completely different from theirs. 
Again, there are those who even think that what they refer to as “Western 
standards of rationality” take precedence over all others, and who are 
ready to view rationality – in its true sense (?) – through the spectacle 
of the  “rationalistic” Western culture. These two, respectively, are the 
impossibility and inappropriateness arguments that are often made 
against traditional cultures. 
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Although these views are usually expressed by some who happen to be 
social scientists, there is evidence of the creeping of such positions into 
philosophy or, rather, the exploitation of such positions by philosophers. 
In this essay, I do not intend to discuss the often-cited exclusion of 
Africa in Hegel’s philosophy of history from the historical races of the 
world, neither do I intend to look at views expressed earlier by Hume 
and Kant about Africans. “Hume, Kant and Hegel, under the euphoria of 
the Enlightenment and in various ways, believed that the history of the 
Western world was the incarnation of Reason as such, and characterized 
non-European forms of life as ‘irrational’” (Eze 1993: 16). I will rather 
focus on arguments that have been made more recently, often subtly but 
with far-reaching philosophical implications for Africa. Throughout this 
essay, the term “Africa” stands for present-day sub-Saharan Africa whose 
cultures are not monolithic but still largely similar.
For a systematic discussion, the rest of the paper is divided into three 
sections. In the first two sections, it rebuts separately the inappropriateness 
and impossibility arguments. The last section presents an African 
(specifically, Akan) alternative to these arguments. 
The Inappropriateness Argument
One philosopher who rejects, and will not accept any judgment of 
rationality that is not consistent with the “scientific” Western perspective 
is Alasdair MacIntyre (1977: 67-71). He discloses this stance in a reaction 
to Peter Winch and, earlier on, to Evans-Pritchard who argued for the 
thesis that one can accept that traditional cultures do hold, and can 
indeed determine by certain criteria, what is rational and what is not. 
MacIntyre denies this claim and asserts, in relation to traditional cultures, 
that “…beliefs and concepts are not merely to be evaluated by the criteria 
implicit in the practice of those who hold and use them.” Consequently, he 
declares, “to make a belief and the concepts which it embodies intelligible 
I cannot help invoking my own criteria, or rather the established criteria 
of my own society…[but, I admit that] I cannot do this until I have already 
grasped the criteria governing belief and behaviour in the society which 
is the object of enquiry.”
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One commendable aspect of MacIntyre’s criterion is that he makes 
attempts, successfully or not, to understand the Other’s criteria before 
determining the rationality of issues that relate to that Other. It cannot 
also be inferred from the above that he rejects the supernatural. However, 
his heavy reliance on Western standards and his unwillingness to accept 
any traditional culture’s justifications for its own beliefs raise two main 
concerns: first, his idea that a culture’s (in this case, Western) standard 
can determine rationality, and secondly, his insistence on using Western 
standards to judge traditional cultures even after learning about the 
standards of the latter.  (A response to the first concern is found in the next 
section.) One can however remark, with regard to the second concern, that 
if MacIntyre cannot help invoking his own culture’s criteria to determine 
whether or not African beliefs, concepts, behaviour and criteria of 
rationality governing belief and behavior are truly rationally acceptable, 
then he implies that a person may not avoid the influence of his culture 
when judging the rationality of issues. The correctness of this exposition 
is confirmed in the summary of MacIntyre’s thesis, made by Winch (1977: 
97) as follows: “The explanation of why, in culture S, certain actions are 
taken to be rational, has got to be an explanation for us; so it must be in 
concepts intelligible to us. If then, in the explanation, we say that in fact 
those criteria are rational, we must be using the word ‘rational’ in our 
sense.”
MacIntyre (op cit: 67)  does not seem to exalt Western “standards” merely 
because he belongs to that culture, but mainly because he thinks the 
West has superior standards. For instance, in addition to his view that the 
Westerner must detect incoherence in standards of intelligibility in non-
Western cultures, his reflection on the statement: “the Azande believe 
that the performance of certain rites in due form affects their common 
welfare,” leads him to the erroneous conclusion that “…one could only 
hold the belief of the Azande rationally in the absence of any practice of 
science and technology…” which, he would say, is undeniably identifiable 
with the West.
As MacIntyre’s “perspectival” view on rationality develops, however, his 
seemingly pitiful state of dilemma begins to give way to his affirmation 
of Western criteria. One could understand the difficulty he finds himself 
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in, having to realize that in the study of what he sees as a completely 
alien culture, understanding is “both necessary and impossible.”  But this 
apparent dilemma does not seem to hold when the basis for its construction 
is carefully examined. The main reason, we may argue, is the issue of 
“perspective”, the Western perspective which alone he recognizes. For 
instance, since, as he implies, Western “anthropologists and sociologists” 
must form their judgments based on “the established criteria” of their 
scientific culture, their understanding of traditional cultures becomes 
at once impossible. This, he notes, is the case in spite of the claim by 
“anthropologists and sociologists …to understand concepts which they 
do not share” (1977: 64).   Claiming to understand what one does not 
share appears to MacIntyre to be tantamount to claiming falsely that two 
completely distinct paradigms are similar. The impossibility aspect of 
the apparent dilemma is, therefore, founded on the supposition that one 
cannot understand concepts that one does not share (ibid: 63, 64). This 
point is noteworthy.
Even when MacIntyre comes to make some sense of the practices of 
traditional cultures, he still holds that the people cannot be taken to be 
doing what is right and sensible. He asserts, “what I am quarrelling with 
ultimately is the suggestion that agreement in following a rule is sufficient 
to guarantee making sense” (ibid: 68). This statement is conceptually true. 
The only problem here is that MacIntyre expresses it only in connection 
with cultures he views as non-scientific. He fails to notice that the 
assertion applies as well to scientific cultures and, also, he does not assess 
the impact of the statement on the conclusions that he draws in his work. 
By this remark, I do not mean that we are guaranteed any “sense making” 
if we adopt scientific rules as a means of explaining metaphysical events 
(or vice versa), but that it is possible for some explanations purported to 
be based on science not to make sense. Indeed, the majority of people in 
a culture who hold a rule or engage in a practice based on the rule could 
be wrong, especially when the rule itself is flawed. And this applies to the 
rule, science is the sole determinant of reality. 
Two crucial questions relating to understanding still remain. Is 
understanding the Other really impossible? And, must a person necessarily 
adopt what his culture offers him in the form of standards? With regard 
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to the first – which we noted of MacIntyre above – I would make just one 
point. It appears quite possible that one can understand the Other (or his 
explanations), if by the verb “understand” it is meant to gain some insight 
into or knowledge of the practices or beliefs of the Other. This, in any 
case, should be what it means to “understand” the Other. It is a different 
thing, I concede, to say that one shares the belief or practice explained. For 
instance, one might not share the belief that there are “ancestral” spirits, 
but one can still understand a people who address the dead in present and 
personal terms as holding the notion of human survival. For, they could 
be said to conceive of those spirits as being alive, in some form, even 
though their bodies have been buried. Yet it is also worthy of note that 
the issues of sharing and convincing explanations are problematic even 
intra-culturally, although it is often suggested that such problems only 
arise in cross-cultural relations. Intra-culturally, we do not always share 
each other’s beliefs, neither do we always find each other’s explanations 
convincing. Thus, if these problems were insuperable, then, it is not only 
cross-cultural understanding that would be impossible, but also several 
aspects of intra-cultural encounters. 
Understanding the Other becomes impossible only when “understanding” 
is interchanged with “sharing”, as Lévy-Bruhl did in the past. In his Les 
Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures, he seemed to have 
equated understanding with the capacity to share a concept. But with the 
meaning I attribute above to the word “understand”, a person is able to 
present or assess fairly the worldview of the Other, without either sharing 
them or imposing his own beliefs. Based on this line of reasoning, it 
is plausible to argue that Lévy-Bruhl’s approach was wrong. From his 
erroneous position, he made some claims about traditional cultures which 
need to be mentioned here, even if briefly. Bent on showing the radical 
alterity between traditional ways of life and those of the “rationalistic” 
West, Lévy-Bruhl singled out language for analysis. His preference for 
language was strategic because the reasons behind what a people do, the 
sense or pointlessness of their practices are mainly expressed through 
their language. If their language is not able to convey their beliefs in a 
relevant manner, we cannot claim to share their beliefs. Thus, he wrote, 
“although we can describe what primitives say, we cannot grasp their 
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concepts. For they do not possess concepts in the sense of recognizing 
that some uses of expression conform to and others break with rules for 
the use of such expressions” (quoted in MacIntyre, ibid., 64). What Lévy-
Bruhl sought to do was to make difficult any chance of understanding the 
primitives in a serious sense, lest any of their practices or beliefs could be 
deemed rational. This way, any talk of “understanding” them would make 
sense in a derisive way, so that “we might by a kind of empathy imagine 
ourselves to be primitives and in this sense ‘understand’; but we might 
equally understand by imaginative sympathy what it is to be a bear or a 
squirrel” (ibid: 64).
Several philosophers, including MacIntyre, have criticized this view in 
the past. But one more point can be made. The fundamental mistake 
regarding the view is that, granted for the sake of argumentation that there 
was no possible way of knowing what reasons were offered by traditional 
cultures for their practices, it would not be fruitful to play down the fact 
that traditional peoples, unlike bears and squirrels, have language. The 
claim that no rules govern the use of expressions in traditional language 
is not even supported by empirical evidence. The claim that the (spoken) 
languages of traditional peoples lack rules could not have been true given, 
for instance, the successful centuries-old translation of the Bible into 
these languages. Again, as Winch rightly notes, rationality “is a concept 
necessary to the existence of any language: to say of a society that it has 
a language is also to say that it has a concept of rationality” (1977: 99). 
Therefore, what is expected of a researcher of language is at least to find 
out the aspects of rationality conveyed through the use of language by the 
people studied. But the success of any such researcher in this exercise, 
especially if he or she is from a culture different from the one studied, 
would certainly depend on the depth of probing and accurate portrayal of 
the specific worldview of the culture studied. These points did not reflect 
clearly in Lévy-Bruhl’s position.
Now, to the second crucial question relating to understanding: MacIntyre 
makes certain remarks that appear to imply that one must necessarily 
accept what pertains in one’s culture even after one has come into contact 
with other cultures. For instance, he states of traditional cultures that we 
cannot expect that their standards “will always be internally coherent…
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But in detecting incoherence of this kind we have already invoked our 
standards. [And] since we cannot avoid doing this it is better to do it self-
consciously” (ibid: 71).  
MacIntyre once again seems to be in a dilemma here. He cannot help but 
invoke his own standards, so he would do so self-consciously. Here too, 
the self-consciousness aspect is refreshing. But first, the desideratum to 
maintain Western standards suffers the same fate as his similar pursuit 
earlier on. Secondly, his view that “we cannot avoid” using “our own 
standard” to judge the rationality of actions is questionable, if by “our 
own standard” he means what we are culturally accustomed to. It is 
always possible to question or even abandon one’s cultural perspective, 
and develop personal principles or adopt the perspective of another. Since, 
for instance, one’s perspective cannot be said to have changed if one 
does not move away from an earlier position, it is to be expected that the 
perspectives of some people who grew up with the notion of  the divine 
right of kings to rule actually changed at the dawn of modern democracy. 
In the same way, the views of some brought up to support the then massive 
(almost unbridled) exploitation of natural resources that accompanied the 
industrial revolution in Europe did, conceivably, gradually changed in 
favour of environmentally friendlier technologies. We can say the same 
of traditional cultures. For instance, the Dipo festival which is celebrated 
by the Krobo people of Ghana marks the transition of girls into adulthood. 
Previously, the girls went through the rites bare-chested; but that is now 
beginning to change. Currently, the exposure of their breasts is regarded 
as indecent by some of the people – including elderly women (initiators) 
who themselves were paraded bare-chested in their adolescent days. 
Breasts are now sometimes covered during initiations.  
As a result of MacIntyre’s inability to see that one does not necessarily 
have to judge the Other through the prism of one’s own culture, he was 
faced with the self-imposed option of affirming only his. If he had not 
done so, it would have meant, to his displeasure, that he had no concept of 
rationality or that he did not know the meaning of the term “rationality” at 
all. With this posture, the question of rationality wrongly took on the form 
of “we against the other(s)”. The fact, then, that something was identifiable 
with “us” appeared somehow enough to guarantee its rationality. For 
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instance, in his attempt to reject Winch’s notion of the “conceptual 
self-sufficiency” of primitive ways of life, MacIntyre declares what 
must inform his rejection of Winch’s position. He states, even without 
supplying any reason why that must be right, that “we do want to reject 
magic, and we want to reject it … as illogical because it fails to come up 
to our criteria of rationality” (ibid: 67).     
In sum, MacIntyre’s interpretation of rationality seemed to misidentify 
(perhaps inadvertently) “differences of perspective” of rationality as 
“differences of standard” of rationality. This led him to uphold just one 
perspective (or, to him, “standard”) of rationality, and classify others as 
unacceptable or inappropriate. I know, for instance, that any standards 
that are internally incoherent cannot be rational. Thus, if what traditional 
African cultures take to be their “standards” of intelligibility (or 
rationality) themselves could be expected by MacIntyre to be incoherent, 
then, wherein lies their capacity to truly determine rationality? Can 
anybody, thus, have any point in challenging MacIntyre’s earlier view 
that the rationality of beliefs and concepts of traditional cultures is not 
to be evaluated merely by the criteria existent in those cultures? And, 
will MacIntyre not be right to claim that Western thinkers are to detect 
with their “standards” of rationality the incoherence of what Africans 
can only see as intelligible, the incoherence of the African standards of 
intelligibility? As I will explain, there is just one concept of rationality, 
and that rationality is not for any culture to determine exclusively. 
The Impossibility Argument
The impossibility argument seeks to establish that traditional cultures 
cannot determine the rationality of actions that pertain to scientific cultures. 
It is suggested that belief in the supernatural limits the rational capacity 
of the (traditional) African thinker. A little background to this view is 
appropriate: in showing why the Azande people of Africa apparently “do 
not see that their oracles tell them nothing”, Evans-Pritchard (1937: 338) 
explained that it was due to “…the fact that their intellectual ingenuity and 
experimental keenness [were] conditioned by patterns of ritual behaviour 
and mystical belief. Within the limits set by these patterns, they [showed] 
great intelligence, but it [could not] operate beyond [those] limits.” Or as 
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deduced by Horton (1977: 154), “they [reasoned] excellently in the idiom 
of their beliefs, but they [could not] reason outside, or against their beliefs 
because they [had] no other idiom in which to express their thoughts.” 
There appear to be traces of this position of Evans-Pritchard’s in African 
philosophy. To buttress my point, let me explain how Horton (ibid: 154) 
appears to profit from the expressed opinion of Evans-Pritchard in the 
development of his philosophy of culture. In contrasting Western and 
traditional African cultures, Horton argues that in the latter, the “absence 
of any awareness of alternatives makes for an absolute acceptance of the 
established theoretical tenets and removes any possibility of questioning 
them.” These tenets, he adds, “invest the believer with a compelling force. 
It is this force which we refer to when we talk of such tenets as sacred.” 
His view is an example of how anthropology creeps into philosophy. 
That view cannot be right because within all cultural boundaries (or 
within the context of “bounded reasoning”, to borrow Ramose’s words2), 
there are some who are trapped in their preconceptions, and others who 
break free from them. Besides, the same person can be trapped in some 
preconceptions but freed from others. Therefore it would be incorrect to 
presume that it was mostly African thinkers who were trapped and that 
Westerners were not.
Quite recently, Gyekye (1995: 3, 7) has rightly criticized Horton for urging 
“a distinction between philosophy and traditional African thought”. 
Gyekye points out that “thought” (as a generic term) and philosophy are 
not mutually exclusive. He adds that by allowing the traditional culture 
a thought system and restricting philosophy – understood narrowly by 
Horton to consist in epistemology – to the West, Horton cannot be said 
to have proven the absence of philosophy in traditional thought because 
metaphysics is not just the core of philosophy in general, but also it “lies 
at the heart of African thought.” Thus, one can observe, belief in the 
supernatural or the metaphysical is neither a hindrance nor antithetical to 
the art of philosophizing.
Even though Hountondji (1983: 60) does not quite argue that the traditional 
African thinker has rational limitation, he has also affirmed the notion 
of “collective thought” in the African culture, and thus characterized 
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traditional thought as “ethno-philosophy”, but not as “philosophy.” In 
Africa, he notes, there is “…merely a collective world-view, an implicit, 
spontaneous, perhaps even unconscious system of beliefs to which all 
Africans are supposed to adhere”. This implies that “everybody always 
agrees with everybody else.” “It follows,” he argues “that in such cultures 
there can never be individual beliefs …but only collective systems of 
belief.” While not denying the visibility of general, cultural world-views 
in the traditional system, it is not right even on factual grounds (such as on 
the evidence of anthropology) to say that “there can never be individual 
beliefs.” But Appiah (1992: 146) rightly points out that anthropologists 
and missionaries have met many traditional thinkers who have rejected 
widely held beliefs. 
Horton’s theses of “absolute acceptance” and “sacredness” of traditional 
beliefs, and Hountondji’s idea of communal group-think cannot be right 
because contrary to the homogeneous, pro-supernaturalism outlook often 
ascribed to traditional African thinkers, the critical individuals are also 
visible. Among the Akans of Ghana, “one not infrequently encounters 
variations in belief among the branches of the Akan tribe and sometimes 
even among the inhabitants of a single village,” but “if one talks with the 
real philosophers among our traditional elders … one is soon impressed 
with their capacity to dissent from received conceptions and to break 
new ground” (Wiredu 1983: 114). A good example is the Akan traditional 
elder, Nana Boafo-Ansah who “thought that Onyame (Supreme Being, 
God), the ancestors, and the abosom (lesser spirits) were all ‘figments of 
the imagination’…” (Gyekye 1995: 48).
The existence of people with dissenting views, or more appropriately, 
of thinkers with the capacity to make critical analysis from non-
supernaturalistic points of view in traditional cultures, unknits all 
arguments that make uncritical attitude an inescapable characteristic of 
the denizens of traditional African cultures. And, since “uncriticality” 
seems to be the right conclusion to be drawn from the perception that 
the traditional thinker exhibits intelligence only within his generally-
held supernatural beliefs, attention has now been drawn to the fact 
that, indeed, the African sage is capable of advancing and defending 
antisupernaturalistic views. However, if such antisupernaturalistic views 
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could be said to be expressive of an attitude which falls outside what 
would normally be considered as consistent with the “African idiom” 
or “African pattern of belief,” but with that of the scientific, then, the 
corollaries are that:
(i) the traditional African intellectual community has always been 
receptive of, and included, critics of widely-held beliefs, indicating 
the presence of alternative patterns of thought;
(ii) the traditional African thinker can function intelligently or reason 
beyond the sphere of mystical belief, because he is capable of 
analyzing, advancing and defending arguments from both natural 
and supernatural outlooks; and, thus,
(iii) he is not only capable of criticizing the Western culture, should the 
need arise, but also is in a position to judge the rationality of Western 
beliefs and practices.
Objective Rationality: The Traditional Akan Position
Following the shortcomings of the inappropriateness and impossibility 
arguments about the nature of rationality, the next alternative – especially 
to the perspectival frame of MacIntyre –would normally be a suggestion 
that rationality should be relative.  But, relativism (which is not the focus 
of this paper) would also be problematic because, as we are about to 
see, it is quite inconsistent with some African positions on rationality. 
It is therefore appropriate that we attempt to go beyond these usual 
conceptions of rationality. In this direction, some basic ideas of Akan 
cultural philosophy would be useful.
In traditional Akan thought, that which is rational to do or believe in is not 
necessarily determined by the fact that one lives in a specific culture, nor is 
it seen as reasonable to some human minds (but not to others). It is neither 
culture-specific nor relative. When the reasons for a belief or action are 
coherent (and thus rational), the traditional Akan thinker expects every 
mind to comprehend it as such. Therefore, rationality is conceived of as 
not just a natural requirement of every human mind, but as determinable 
by every mind. The reason seems to be that the human mind, using the 
principles of logic, would affirm the truth or reasonableness of a concept, 
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irrespective of the person or culture whose concept it is. The Akan maxim 
nokware yε baako (literally, “there is only one truth”) underscores this 
point. This maxim may also be taken to imply that the truth or logical 
acceptability of a concept or proposition determined in one culture should 
not metamorphose into falsehood when it is being considered in a different 
human setting3.
Philosophical Implications of the Traditional Akan Position
(i) If it is assumed, for instance, that cultures in which supernaturalism 
is widespread would rationalize ritual practices, while cultures 
in which antisupernaturalism is prevalent rationalize laboratory 
investigations, the Akan position would deem it wrong to claim 
that rationality is made relative here. The truth, the traditional Akan 
thinker would argue, is that: (i) either a ritual practice – and to some 
extent, supernaturalism – is rationalizable or it is not; and, (ii) either 
a laboratory investigation is capable of being rational or it is not. 
Thus, if a particular ritual practice and a laboratory investigation 
are said to be rational, it should not be just because the cultures 
which engage in them claim they are, but because these actions are 
performed for reasons that conform to the dictates of the logical 
mind. One such dictate is the coherence of the methods or beliefs 
underlying the practices.
(ii) The Akan concept is similar to the Platonic “forms” (or ideas), 
according to which theory the truth or “real nature” of things lies 
beyond the physical world, and is rather grasped by the human 
mind.4 In our case also, cultural peculiarities of the physical world 
do not determine rationality; rather, that which is rational is expected 
to be appealing to, and recognized as such by every logical mind. In 
terms of rationality, then, traditional arguments and practices related 
to belief in spirits can be assessed by any human being, without 
subjecting them to the popular opinions of one’s culture.
(iii)  Therefore, rationality is not a cultural construct as such, for the mind 
is capable of grasping that which is logical and reasonable without 
necessarily resorting to cultural biases. Consequently, the question 
of rationality, according to the Akan position, can be addressed 




This paper has discussed the concepts of supernaturalism and rationality 
mainly from a practical point of view. As a result of the perception 
of some philosophers and social scientists that supernaturalism and 
rationality are opposite concepts, belief in the supernatural is used by 
such scholars to characterize traditional cultures as irrational – i.e., as 
lacking the capacity to determine rationality properly – or as limited in 
terms of rational capacity. However, these positions (respectively named 
the inappropriateness and impossibility arguments) have been shown to be 
flawed in several respects. Using the traditional Akan position, rationality 
has been explained to be not just a noncultural concept, but also one that is 
capable of being exhibited or determined by any individual of any culture. 
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Notes
1. Peter Winch (1977: 99) is one of such philosophers. He, however, argues 
from a relativistic angle.
2. He uses this expression in the essay ‘The Question of Identity in Intercultural 
Philosophy.’
3. Some might suppose that the Akan position “nokware yε baako” is a 
culturally specific belief in absolute truth, and then claim that relativism 
recognizes such truths, except that it regards them as false. But this only 
means that relativism is still not accommodative of the Akan perspective 
that some truths are noncultural.
4. Meno (82b-85b).  As Cloete also observes, Plato recognizes that “the 
‘logical’ element” is “foundational to the possibility of “making sense” of 
our heterogeneous experiences in the world” (2011: 10).
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